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Abstract 
 
From a service owned and provided by local government, UK municipal waste management 
has become one increasingly provided by large multinational companies. A series of political 
decisions laid the basis for the shift. It began with the programme of deregulation, contracting 
out and privatisation introduced by the Conservative governments of the 1980s. New Labour 
continued this process with the cumulative result that a new market in municipal waste exists 
today. Its development has also influenced the shape of the already existing wider waste 
management market with the result that this too has seen a process of concentration. A 
vertically integrated sector under municipal ownership was broken up and now appears to be 
heading for a vertical reintegration of the sector on the basis of private sector ownership. With 
the UK government’s rejection of a public sector option, it is obliged to make a series of 
complicated interventions to attempt to further shape the market in order to meet environmental 
policy goals. The reliance on the market illustrates the difficulties in implementing major policy 
shifts through that medium. 
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Politics and Markets: the case of UK Municipal Waste 
Management 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In the UK, municipal waste management is like a referee at a sports event – nobody notices 
until something goes wrong. But when that happens, it grabs the headlines. During the ‘Winter 
of Discontent’ in 1978/79 just before the fall of the Callaghan government and the election of 
Mrs Thatcher’s Conservatives, pictures of uncollected piles of rubbish in the streets served as 
media shorthand for the collapse of government control and the descent into chaos. 
 
This paper makes two main contributions. The first is to outline the development of the 
municipal waste management market in the UK over the last twenty years; the second is to 
illustrate the interplay between politics and the market through the prism of one public service. 
It argues that the connection between UK municipal waste management and politics is not just 
as an episodic indicator of social disorder. Particularly over the last twenty years, politics has 
played a critical role in changing the structure, actors and priorities of the sector. A series of 
political decisions laid the basis for the reshaping of municipal waste management in the UK 
from a sector almost completely owned and run by municipal authorities into a new market in 
which private sector companies have become increasingly active.  
 
This paper examines those political decisions and the legislation at both UK and European 
level which influenced the restructuring. It considers the intentions (social, political and 
environmental) of the legislative changes and their actual cumulative impact. It shows how the 
changes in the sector from an industry dominated by municipal provision into one opened up to 
the private sector, led to the entry of foreign multinationals and a rapid growth in concentration 
in the industry. 
 
The interaction of state and market in one sub-sector of the economy (municipal waste 
management) not only restructured the sub-sector but acted as a lever to reshape the wider UK 
waste management sector. The municipal waste management sector is relatively small – both 
in terms of finance and employment. However it is relevant to a wider discussion of public 
sector reform in the UK for three reasons: the high profile asset sales of state industries and 
utilities of the 1980s and 1990s are effectively over and have been replaced by various forms of 
private sector provision of public services and municipal waste management is just such an 
example of a public service that has been opened up to the market; the reforms have been in 
place for long enough to observe developments following the creation of a new market; and, it 
is a sector in which the government is trying to indirectly manage major policy objectives. The 
paper begins by placing the industry in its present day context in terms of the generation of 
waste in Britain. It then examines the developments within the sector over the last two 
decades, highlighting the drivers of change, and analysing the effects of political intervention. 
The paper examines how the sector was first broken up and then, under the impact of market 
forces, how it has begun to reintegrate under private sector ownership.  It concludes with a 
review of the interplay between state and market and how the government is attempting to 
direct the development of the sector to meet its environmental goals. 
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2 Municipal Waste Management in the UK today 
 
The municipal waste sector is a sub-sector of the larger waste management industry. This is an 
area in which there are several problems of definitions. ‘Waste’ is a social construct influenced 
by time and place. What is waste today may not be tomorrow, and what is thrown away in the 
UK may not be in the Philippines. It is complicated further by the fact that it is reported in terms 
of its source (such as household, industrial or commercial waste), the type of material, and in 
terms of processes or characteristics (Hicks et al., 2004). 
 
The EU Framework Directive on Waste (OJ L 78, 1991) defines waste as ‘any substance or 
object that the holder discards, or intends or is required to discard’. The UK Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 uses the term ‘waste’ to cover most unwanted materials, including any 
scrap material, effluent or unwanted surplus substance or article that requires to be disposed of 
because it is broken, worn out, contaminated or otherwise spoiled. Explosives and radioactive 
wastes are excluded (Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA, 2005). 
 
In the UK, household waste is defined by the Environmental Protection Act 1990 as including 
waste from household collection rounds, waste from services such as street sweeping, 
collection of bulky waste, hazardous household waste, household clinical waste, separate 
garden waste and litter, waste from civic amenity sites and wastes separately collected for 
recycling or composting through bring/drop off schemes, kerbside schemes and at civic 
amenity sites (Emery et al, 2003; DEFRA, 2005). Local authorities have a statutory duty to 
ensure that household waste is collected and disposed of. (Bello and Szymanski, 1996). 
 
Municipal waste is a hybrid. The EU Landfill Directive (Article 2(b)) defines ‘municipal waste’ 
as: 
 
‘waste from households, as well as waste which, because of its nature and 
composition, is similar to waste from households’ (OJ L 182, 1999). 
 
The UK government has interpreted this to encompass all waste under the control of local 
authorities (DEFRA, 2004b). This includes household waste and any other wastes collected by 
a local authority (including its agents) such as municipal parks and gardens waste, beach 
cleansing waste, commercial or industrial waste and waste resulting from the clearance of fly-
tipped materials (DEFRA, 2005). Most local authorities also collect some commercial or 
industrial waste, and although it is usually a small proportion of the waste that they deal with, it 
is categorised as municipal waste (DEFRA, 2004b). 
 
So, of the estimated 335 million tonnes of waste produced each year in the UK, about 220 
million tonnes of this is controlled waste (household, industrial and commercial, including 
construction and demolition wastes) (DEFRA, 2007). In 2005/06, total municipal waste in 
England amounted to 28.7 million tonnes (of which 89% or 25.5 million tonnes was household 
waste) - this equates to about 505 kilos of household waste per person per year (DEFRA, 
2007a). 
 
Overall, municipal waste is only about 9% of the total waste stream (DEFRA, 2007) but it has a 
significance beyond this (Hazell, 2005) for several reasons: a lower proportion of it is recycled 
than other waste; it is regarded as a major contributor to the production of gases that affect 
global warming; it continues to increase at a rate that is regarded as unsustainable; and, there 
is a limit to the amount of landfill space available. Because of these environmental concerns, it 
 5
is the focus of the EU Landfill Directive which requires the UK to reduce the amount of 
biodegradable municipal waste that is landfilled.  
 
In 2005/06 in England, 17.8 million tonnes of municipal waste were landfilled (62%), 10% 
burned in incinerators to produce electricity and 27.1% recycled or composted (DEFRA, 
2007a). By 2020 the UK has a target of sending just 6.39 million tonnes of municipal waste 
direct to landfill (Hansard, 2005), so there will have to be a massive increase in the tonnage of 
waste recycled, composted, incinerated or treated.  
 
The governance of municipal waste in the UK is not straightforward. Municipal waste 
management has been under the control of local councils since the 1875 Public Health Act. 
However, as it is a devolved issue it is the responsibility of the devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the role of local government varies slightly in the 
different parts of the UK. DEFRA is responsible for setting waste policy in England and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) for funding and the regulation of 
local authorities. The regulation of waste is a function of the Environment Agency in England 
and Wales (a part of central government) and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency in 
Scotland. In England responsibility is usually split: waste collection is dealt with by district 
councils (designated as Waste Collection Authorities, WCAs) while county councils have 
responsibility for waste disposal (Waste Disposal Authorities, WDAs). However, the London 
borough councils, and the metropolitan and unitary councils in England, Scotland and Wales 
are responsible for all services. In Northern Ireland, the district councils are also responsible for 
all services. This split between collection and disposal is unique in Europe to England and is 
increasingly seen as a problem by the Government in its efforts to coordinate action to meet its 
targets.  
 
Despite its relatively small size, the municipal waste sector is financially important. Between 
2001-02 and 2005-06 waste spending by English local authorities increased from  £1.65 billion 
to £2.44 billion (DEFRA, 2007) equivalent to about 1.5 % of total expenditure (Hazell, 2005). It 
is expected to rise by another 9% in 2006/07 to £2.6 billion (Local Government Association, 
2007). Expenditure on waste is funded through the Environmental, Protective and Cultural 
Services allocations of the revenue support grant, council tax receipts, Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) credits and DEFRA’s Waste Performance and Efficiency Grants. This paper concentrates 
on England (unless specified) as the largest component of the UK. The issues raised in relation 
to England are broadly the same as those throughout the UK. 
 
3 Drivers of change in UK municipal waste management 
 
The developments in municipal waste management in the UK are linked with two separate 
movements: the wider push to extend the role of private companies and introduce markets into 
the public sector; and growing environmental concerns driven by pressure on the UK from the 
European Union. Both are highly politically charged, both have spawned various legislative 
action and both have impacted on the other, together transforming the way municipal waste 
management operates. This section briefly identifies the key legislative landmarks in that 
process – both at European and UK level. 
European environmental legislation: the Landfill Directive 
 
European Union waste strategy has been a key influence on the UK. The most important 
directives relating to waste management are the Waste Management Framework (75/442/EEC) 
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and, because of the UK’s reliance on landfill as the prime method of disposal, the Landfill of 
Waste Directive (99/31/EC) (EU, 2005). It came into force on 16 July 2001 with the declared 
aim of preventing, or reducing as far as possible, the negative effects of landfilling waste on the 
environment and on human health. The Directive sets mandatory targets for the reduction of 
biodegradable municipal waste sent to landfill. After taking account of the UK’s derogations 
under the directive, the targets are:  
 
• By 2010 to reduce biodegradable municipal waste landfilled to 75% of the 1995 
volume; 
• By 2013 to reduce biodegradable municipal waste landfilled to 50% of the 1995 
volume; 
• By 2020 to reduce biodegradable municipal waste landfilled to 35% of the 1995 
volume. 
(OJ L 182, 1999) 
 
The Directive also bans the landfilling of tyres, liquid waste and infectious clinical waste and 
bans the co-disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous waste. A number of UK policy 
mechanisms have been set up to assist in the shift from landfill. A landfill tax escalator raises 
the cost of landfillling annually. Each local authority is set an annual limit of the amount of 
biodegradable municipal waste that they can send to landfill under the Landfill Allowance 
Trading Scheme (LATS). Every tonne over the limit triggers a fine unless the authority can buy 
additional allowances from authorities with a surplus (slightly different systems operate in 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). English councils have also been set mandatory 
recycling and composting targets. 
UK legislation 
 
Several pieces of UK legislation have influenced UK municipal waste management – both 
under the Conservative administrations up until 1997, and since under Labour. Some of the 
legislation simply transposed European directives into UK law. Of more interest for the 
purposes of this paper is that which relates to government attempts to restructure the municipal 
waste sector and strengthen the market. The three most important initiatives are two Acts 
passed under the Conservatives (the Local Government Act 1988 and the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990) and Labour’s Local Government Act 1999, which covered Best Value. 
The Conservative push to involve the private sector 
 
Although influenced by principal-agent and public choice theories and enthusiastically 
embracing both contracting out and its cousin privatisation, the Conservative governments of 
1979-97 imposed their own pragmatic limits on their crusade. Happy to sell off state owned 
enterprises and to contract out support services in the public sector, they stopped short at what 
was seen as the politically risky option of large-scale private sector involvement in the clinical 
side of the National Health Service or core activities in other public services (ironically, it took a 
Labour government to make that step). 
 
Not only was contracting out of public services in line with the latest management consultancy 
orthodoxy (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Osborn and Gaebler, 1992), but it also fitted with the 
government’s desire to cut public spending to enable tax cuts and weaken the unions (local 
government was a well-organised sector). It struck at the core of what Mrs Thatcher saw as the 
twin props of ‘socialism’ - public ownership and strong unions. She described privatisation as:  
 7
 
… one of the central means of reversing the corrosive effects of socialism… Just as 
nationalisation was at the heart of the collectivist programme by which Labour 
governments sought to remodel British society, so privatisation is at the centre of any 
programme of reclaiming territory for freedom (Thatcher, 1993). 
 
The doctrine of privatisation and the contracting out of public services is now seen as one of 
the defining features of late 20th century British Conservatism. But it began very modestly. As 
Shaoul (1997) notes, in 1979 there was not a coherent and explicit set of objectives, these 
gradually evolved. When Mrs Thatcher first came to power there was no mention of competitive 
tendering or contracting out in the Conservative manifesto of that year. It simply claimed that 
‘the reduction of waste, bureaucracy and over-government will [also] yield substantial savings’, 
referred to the waste of ‘local direct labour schemes’ and pledged to ‘provide safeguards 
against unfair competition from direct labour’ (Conservative Party, 1979). 
 
The 1983 election manifesto contained references to tendering for services in the National 
Health Service (NHS), central government, local government and transport, but still referred to 
encouraging rather than requiring local authorities to contract out (Conservative Party, 1983). 
At the time, the Economist noted: The real purpose of contracting out… is as much to weaken 
the unions’ monopoly grip as to save money’ (17 September 1983, cited in Sachdev, 2001). 
 
What may have begun as a pragmatic way of meeting a number of different but related 
objectives (cutting public expenditure, reducing staffing levels in the public sector, weakening 
public sector unions) came to be seen as part of the emergence of neo-liberal ideology at 
governmental level in the UK (Grimshaw et al, 2002). Buckland (1987) describes contracting 
out as one of the then Conservative government’s ‘three interlocking mechanisms’ used in its 
attempt to shift the boundary between public and private sector activity (the other two being 
asset sales of nationalised industries and the transfer of property ownership through council 
house sales). 
 
As Fairbrother and Poynter (2001) commented, public service reform had two related themes: 
the introduction of new sets of market relations and new management approaches designed to 
make these new market relations work. The Conservatives applied this approach throughout 
those public services that were not appropriate for asset sales (for example, Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering (CCT) and the internal market in the NHS; Local Management of 
Schools and CCT in local government; contracting out, the Financial Management Initiative and 
Next Steps Agencies within the Civil Service; and the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) across the 
public services). There is no evidence that ministers deliberately aimed for and engineered a 
situation which would result in the entry of foreign multinationals and the rapid concentration of 
the waste management sector. On the other hand, despite the rhetoric about encouraging 
SMEs, neither is there any evidence that they were too upset at this outcome. 
Local Government Act 1988 
 
In local government, the most significant initiative was CCT. Although it eventually applied to a 
wide range of municipal services, it was first introduced for construction, maintenance and 
highways work under the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. It was later 
extended to other services. As Brown et al (2007: 616) point out, refuse collection is often 
regarded as the ‘quintessential public service ripe for contracting’ because it involves few 
specific assets, and has tasks, outcomes and outputs that are relatively easy to identify, So it 
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was no surprise that the Local Government Act 1988 extended CCT to blue collar services 
such as refuse collection and ground maintenance. 
 
By this time some Conservative ministers had a much clearer view of where this policy should 
lead. Nicholas Ridley said:  
 
I can foresee a much more diverse pattern of provision in the future by a variety of 
different agencies working alongside local authorities. The role of the local authority will 
no longer be that of the universal provider. But it will continue to have a key role in 
ensuring that there is adequate provision … (Ridley, 1988). 
 
Under CCT, designated services had to be put out to tender by local authorities. While the UK 
was not the only country to attempt to encourage a ‘culture of competition’ (Boyne, 1998), it is 
unusual in that it was the only OECD country to introduce a compulsory model of competitive 
tendering (Walsh and O’Flynn, 2000). In 1982 the Conservative government denounced ILO 
Convention No. 94 on Labour Clauses (Public Contracts), which required contracts to include 
clauses ensuring that pay and working conditions are not less favourable than those 
established for work of the same character in the trade or industry concerned. This was 
followed in 1983 by the abolition of the Fair Wages Resolution, which obliged contractors 
carrying out work for the public sector to abide by the wage rates of the equivalent public sector 
worker. The unions (Wing, 2003) saw this as a precursor to the introduction of CCT. It had 
effectively operated as a disincentive for contractors to undercut wages and conditions as a 
way to compete for contracts with in-house teams. Consequently, it also acted to dissuade 
contractors from bidding for public sector work more generally. 
 
When the Local Government Act 1988 extended CCT, it meant that a municipal authority could 
only retain an in-house provision if its own Direct Labour Organisation (DLO) or Direct Services 
Organisation (DSO) won the tender in open competition. The tendering took place at fixed 
periods and was subject to national guidelines. It became unlawful for local authorities and 
other public bodies to use ‘contract compliance’. Part II of the Act identified a series of ‘non-
commercial matters’ that were not permitted to be considered in evaluating bids, including the 
following in section 17 (5): 
 
The terms and conditions of employment by contractors of their workers or the 
composition of, the arrangements for the promotion, transfer or training of or 
the other opportunities afforded to, their workforces. (HMSO 1988) 
 
Local authorities were not permitted to engage in ‘anti-competitive behaviour’. This was 
interpreted as meaning that in awarding a contract, local authorities were not allowed to act in a 
manner having the effect, or intended or likely to have the effect, of restricting or preventing 
competition. The burden was on local authorities to demonstrate that they had taken steps to 
avoid having such an effect. So for example, they were expected to consult with the private 
sector on the packaging of contracts (OECD 2000). The Secretary of State had wide ranging 
powers to step in and act if contractors, ‘the public’, opposition councillors or the Secretary of 
State felt that there had been a breach of CCT rules, particularly if the contract had been 
awarded to the in-house provider (the DSO). DSOs were expected to break even thereby 
preventing them undercutting private sector contractors. There was (and is) no regulation of 
prices, nor of ownership of firms able to bid for tenders (OECD 2000). 
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Environmental Protection Act 1990 
 
The other significant piece of legislation was the 1990 Environmental Protection Act. One of its 
provisions was that local authorities were obliged to reorganise their waste disposal operations 
into arms-length, wholly-owned Local Authority Waste Disposal Companies (LAWDCs). Waste 
disposal contracts had to be put out to tender and LAWDCs were obliged to compete for them 
with private sector companies. So, just as with refuse collection, waste disposal was separated 
and contractorised. 
New Labour – Continuity not change 
 
As Deakin and Walsh (1996) pointed out, under the Conservatives the market did not 
completely replace hierarchical control in the public sector although the balance shifted towards 
a contract-based service. To the disappointment of many of its supporters and the surprise of 
some academics (Boyne, 1998) the election of the new Labour government in 1997 saw a 
process of continuity and development rather than change. Shortly after the election, the new 
local government minister, Hilary Armstrong explained that although CCT was to end, there 
would be no wholesale return to public provision: ‘Our approach to improve local services is a 
pragmatic one. What matters is what works. The form of service delivery must not be 
determined by ideology’ (cited in CBI, 2004). This is a theme that is repeated throughout the 
Blair years, i.e. the Government is committed to a pragmatic, non-ideological approach of 
supporting ‘what works’ (Labour party, 1997). The Conservative initiatives identified by Deakin 
and Walsh (1996) – purchaser-provider split, development of contracts and quasi-contracts, 
and trading systems based on prices and user choice – all continued under Labour and have 
been developed further. In one of his first public speeches as Prime Minister, Tony Blair 
contrasted his objectives with those of his predecessors, saying that Government needed to be 
‘pragmatic and rigorous about what does and does not work’, that New Labour would ‘find out 
what works, and we will support the successes and stop the failures’ (Blair, 1997). More 
recently, in a passage strongly reminiscent of the Conservative minister Nicholas Ridley, 
eighteen years earlier (see above), the current Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, John Hutton (2006), explained that: 
 
government must be ever sharper and more adept at creating and managing 
contestable forms of service delivery. Alternative providers, whether in the private, 
public or third sectors, should be the norm, not the exception  
 
What Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) called public service ‘quasi-markets’, continued - albeit with 
some amendments. This reinvention of government model (Osborn and Gaebler, 1992) around 
an ‘enabling state’ using markets and contracts has the state focus on its ‘core’ activity, leaving 
peripheral activities to the private or voluntary sector - ‘sticking to the knitting’ (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982). The language of new Labour is less hostile to the public sector and there is 
more public money available for investment. However, despite the talk of first, stake-holding 
(Hutton, W., 1995), and then partnership, the fundamental line of march remains the same: 
private sector solutions are required for public sector problems (Grimshaw et al, 2002).  
 
Labour’s relatively new enthusiasm for markets also allowed it to develop what Burnham (2001) 
describes as a governing strategy of ‘depoliticisation’, or the adoption of a rule-based system in 
contrast to a discretion-based or ‘politicised’ system of economic management. Such a strategy 
does not remove politics from the stage, but places ‘at one remove the political character of 
decision-making’ (Burnham, 1999) leaving the state with arms length control but with the 
 10
supposed benefit of being able to distance itself from the impact of the decision. Contracting 
out is a part of such an approach with a diminishing of direct state control of the provision of 
public services, the use of markets and reliance on semi-independent or independent 
regulatory or audit bodies. Public sector reform through competition and markets is now part of 
the received wisdom of both major UK parties. Although the details may be disputed, 
‘modernisation’ is bipartisan. ‘What matters is what works’ (Blair, 1998) has joined the other 
clichés like ‘steering not rowing’ (Osborn and Gaebler, 1992) in the lexicon of public sector 
managers and politicians. 
Best Value replaces CCT 
 
The new Labour government ended the ‘compulsory’ element of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (CCT), replacing it with the Best Value system in the Local Government Act 1999, 
but contracting out has continued. The 1998 White Paper explained Labour’s reasoning:  
 
‘… the current framework for service delivery has proved inflexible in practice, often 
leading to the demoralisation of those expected to provide quality services and to high 
staff turnover. Concentration on CCT has neglected service quality and led to uneven 
and uncertain efficiency gains. In short, this framework has provided a poor deal for 
local people, for employees, and for employers.’ (Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, DETR 1998) 
 
But it was the ‘compulsory’ element of CCT that appeared to distress Labour ministers rather 
than the contracting element, so its replacement – Best Value – retained contracting out as an 
essential component. The Best Value regime came into effect in England in April 2000. The 
arrangements were slightly different in the devolved government areas of the UK (Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland). Under the new regime, Best Value Performance Indicators 
(BVPIs) - a national measure of performance - are set by central government, and national 
league tables of performance are then published. There are BVPIs for 90 local authority 
functions (covering about 25% of council services) including nine in waste (ODPM, 2003). The 
government defines Best Value as ‘the duty of continuous improvement for local authorities as 
set by the Local Government Act 1999’ (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005). Best Value 
has a wider reach than CCT, applying to all services. Although municipal authorities are no 
longer obliged to put designated services out to tender, they must seek continuous 
improvements in economy, efficiency and effectiveness. All services must be regularly 
reviewed (a 5 year cycle) using the 4 ‘C’s (DETR 1999): 
 
• Challenge purpose 
• Compare performance 
• Consult community 
• Compete with others 
 
So although the obligation to tender has been removed, there remained a heavy emphasis on 
competition.  Under new legislation currently going through Parliament (the Local Government 
and Public Involvement in Health Bill), there are likely to be some further changes. The 
government intends to: 
 
relax those more prescriptive process requirements [such as BVPIs], whilst sharpening 
the focus on two key areas where best value has not had the impact envisaged – 
citizen engagement and competition. 
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(DCLG, 2006: 120) 
 
Part of this will be ‘to stimulate new markets in order to secure alternative provision and enable 
both commissioner and user choice in areas of local government which are currently 
uncontested or not fully contested’ and to ‘increase the capacity and competitiveness in 
existing supply markets’ (DCLG, 2006: 145). 
The Private Finance Initiative 
 
The second mechanism of relevance was the revamped Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Having 
campaigned against PFI while in opposition, the new Labour government made a swift U-turn. 
After consultation with the private sector, the procedures were changed and PFI 
enthusiastically embraced. Ministers saw it as a painless means of financing public sector 
infrastructure investment without incurring debt on the government accounts. There remains 
some reluctance among local authorities because of its impact on revenue budgets (APSE, 
2007). However, despite PFI attracting a great deal of opposition and controversy with critics 
arguing that it is an extremely expensive way of borrowing money (Pollock, 2004), it has played 
an important part in the construction of hospitals, prisons, schools and roads and now a 
growing role in the waste management sector. 
4 The private sector enters municipal waste management 
 
The various measures taken by the Conservative and Labour governments since 1988 served 
to create a market in municipal waste management and encourage the entry of private 
contractors. Different forms of privatisation contributed to, and ran in tandem with, a process of 
rationalisation and concentration in the UK waste management industry. Two other factors 
played a role in the reconfiguration of the market: the expansionist policies of the newly 
privatised water companies and the withdrawal of two very large American multinationals from 
the UK. At about the same time that CCT was brought in and local authorities obliged to divest 
themselves of their disposal operations, the newly privatised UK water companies began to 
look for acquisitions. Severn Trent bought Biffa in 1991; South West Water (Pennon) took over 
Haul Waste and, with later acquisitions, created Viridor Waste; and Yorkshire Water (Kelda) 
merged its waste interests into Waste Recycling Group (WRG) in return for a 46% share in the 
new WRG. Thames Water also had a waste management unit. The French parent companies 
of Sita and Veolia Environmental Services (respectively Suez and Veolia) are also primarily 
water companies, although they have extensive interests in both waste and energy. 
 
According to Biffa, there were several reasons for this link between water and waste 
companies:  
• common ground in operational and technical practices and considerable scope 
for joint ventures, especially in the field of liquid waste.  
• in the interest of water companies to have influence and control over landfill 
and liquid waste disposal.  
• the waste industry was moving into a more mature phase where the leading 
companies had the potential for an enormous gain in the share of a highly 
fragmented market  
(Biffa, 2005a) 
 
In an unconnected development at the end of the 1990s, the two dominant world waste 
management companies, Waste Management Inc and BFI both withdrew to North America, 
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selling their assets throughout the world – including those in the UK. Their successors remain 
enormous companies but today they no longer have a presence outside North America. BFI 
sold most of its non-North American operations to Sita in 1998. In the UK, Sita picked up BFI’s 
operations and Biffa bought WMI’s subsidiary, UK Waste. 
 
Dr Cathy O’Brien, president of the Chartered Institution of Wastes Management, has 
commented that:  
 
‘the speed of change within the waste management world has been faster in the last 
10 years than the previous 90 and the rate of change at the moment seems 
exponential’ (IWM, 2001).  
 
This continuing process of change has been particularly marked within municipal waste 
management with accelerated consolidation or shakeout. Several factors lie behind this, the 
most crucial being the introduction of CCT. Driven by a combination of privatisation measures 
and environmental legislation, the market favoured larger companies with the benefits of 
economies of scale. Many smaller firms became less viable and either went out of business, 
merged or were bought by the larger companies. These developments played out slightly 
differently in municipal waste collection and municipal waste disposal. 
Waste collection 
 
In UK municipal waste collection, there is competition for the market rather than in the market. 
In other words, residents do not face an array of contractors competing to collect their 
household waste. Rather a local monopoly is usually established on the basis of some form of 
competitive tender for the market. By contrast, there is competition in the market for 
commercial and industrial waste collection (at least for the larger customers). Waste collection 
is a more labour intensive operation than waste disposal, and it is common for collection 
tenders to attract a relatively small number of bids (usually up to six) while the bigger disposal 
contracts may attract larger numbers (OECD 2000). Compared to waste treatment and 
disposal, the regulatory burden of waste collection is light and entry costs are low. However, 
profit margins are also lower than treatment and disposal, usually achieving margins of 3% to 
7%, for high value contracts up to 10% (OFT, 2006). 
 
Before CCT, the private sector consisted of a large number of small firms mostly regionally 
based or specialising in a particular waste management expertise (Health and Safety 
Executive, 2004). For example, in 1974 one of today’s main companies – Biffa – had just three 
depots, three landfills and under 100 employees (Biffa, 2005). Today Biffa has revenue of 
£742.7 million, 64 industrial and commercial, and 23 municipal collection depots, 42 treatment 
and operating centres, 32 landfill sites, over 1,500 collection vehicles and over 5,000 UK 
employees (Biffa, 2007). 
 
In addition, very few local authorities contracted out refuse collection. In 1981 there were only 
two councils using private contractors (Maldon and Mid-Bedfordshire), while Southend 
contracted out that year and a further twenty nine followed in the period to 1986 (Domberger et 
al, 1986). Progress remained slow before the introduction of the legislation. Between 1981 and 
1986 only 55 authorities even tendered their refuse services, and as late as 1984/85, only 38 
out of 403 local authorities did so (Domberger et al, 1986). The introduction of CCT in 1988 
made the UK waste management market very attractive for large multinationals. By 1994, the 
market for contracted out services in local government (including waste management) was 
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worth about £2.5 billion compared with a figure of just £50 million a decade earlier (Domberger, 
1998). It is no coincidence that two French multinationals active in the waste management 
sector, Sita and Onyx*, entered the UK after the introduction of CCT (Sita entered in 1989 and 
Onyx began serious operations in the UK in 1990). 
 
However, despite the impact of CCT, not all municipal collection has been contracted out. 
According to the government, as recently as 1998, the percentage of collection services 
delivered by Direct Service Operations (DSOs) was 90%, falling to 60% today (DCLG, 2006a). 
By weight, DSOs have 53% of municipal contracts (Office of Government Commerce, OGC, 
2006) and this position does not seem to vary by region (Office of Fair Trading, OFT, 2006). A 
survey of local authorities carried out for the OGC revealed that in 2005, the key private sector 
players in municipal waste collection contracts were Onyx, Cleanaway (now owned by Veolia), 
Sita and Biffa. These four companies (now three) had 27% of the collection contracts by 
tonnage (OFT, 2006). Another three larger suppliers (Shanks, Viridor and WRG) also held 
significant contracts and the rest were distributed among SMEs, many of which hold a single 
collection contract with just one local authority (ibid). 
Waste disposal 
 
Waste disposal is capital intensive and contracts are generally longer than those for collection. 
This reflects the companies’ desire for a return on their capital investment in infrastructure. Like 
collection, municipal waste disposal is also usually based on competition for the market through 
tendering. Profit margins for treatment and disposal contracts are typically between 7% and 
10% and up to 15% for high value contracts (OFT, 2006). 
The effect of divestment of municipal disposal 
 
The Environmental Protection Act 1990 obliged local authorities to divest themselves of their 
waste disposal function and many initially formed arms-length Local Authority Waste Disposal 
Companies (LAWDCs) to take over this function. However, the pressure to sell these 
companies was intense and most waste disposal is now controlled by the private sector 
(Energie, 2002). UNISON (2003) estimate that by 1998, 21 of these LAWDCs had been taken 
over by private waste companies. Since then the trend has continued with almost all of the 
major waste management companies (including Biffa, Cory, Sita, Veolia Environmental 
Services, Viridor and WRG) buying up LAWDCs. The obligation on councils to divest 
themselves of waste disposal was repealed in October 2005 but today there are just nine 
LAWDCs left and for five of them the parent WDA is beginning or about to begin long term PFI 
procurements for waste disposal and two others are undertaking PPP procurements (DEFRA, 
2005b). 
 
Eight or nine suppliers manage around 78% of waste treatment and disposal by weight and 
most have a regional rather than a national presence (OGC, 2006). The Institution of Civil 
Engineers (ICE, 2004) estimate that before 2020 the UK will need between 1500 and 2300 new 
recycling, reprocessing, treatment and disposal facilities if it is to meet its obligations under the 
Landfill Directive for diversion of biodegradable municipal waste from landfill. This could cost 
between £10bn and £30bn. ICE told the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee (2005) it was sceptical as to whether the waste management industry had 
the capacity for that level of investment. A study carried out for DEFRA which examined the 
                                                 
* Onyx changed its name to Veolia Environmental Services in 2006 
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experience of other European countries, noted that barriers to investment had ‘often been 
overcome by the waste management services being financed through higher internal taxes and 
central government’ (AEA Technology, 2007:11) .The scale of investment perceived to be 
necessary and the financial constraints felt by local authorities also act as an encouragement 
for local authorities to sell the remaining LAWDCs. As one commentator noted: ‘Investments of 
this size, however worthy, are likely to be given a low priority by almost all local authority 
shareholders whose capital spending is under critical government control. It is not that they are 
barred from tendering, it is simply just too much to take on’ (Holmes, 1998). 
Waste Management PFI 
 
In some respects waste disposal was a perfect area for proponents of the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI):  
 
• Local authorities required considerable investment to meet targets for moving away 
from reliance on landfill, but central government blocked traditional financing methods;  
• central government was, however, prepared to fund PFI projects in waste disposal; 
• central government faced a tight schedule because of European legislation and 
needed a quick solution;  
• PFI schemes were seen by companies as ideal for large industrial construction 
projects such as incinerators because they provide guaranteed long term income 
streams; 
• many of the large waste companies already had experience in other countries in 
building or running incinerators; 
• some argued that energy from waste offers the opportunity for meeting EU 
requirements on renewables as well as landfill diversion and that energy prices could 
make this an attractive market for investors. 
 
Borrowing restrictions have been eased on local authorities with the Prudential Capital Scheme 
brought in with the Local Government Act 2003. However there remains a ‘sizeable gap’ in 
infrastructure investment needs estimated at £8 billion over ten years ‘which represents a major 
investment opportunity for the private sector’ (DEFRA, 2004a). 
 
The Institution of Civil Engineers and the Renewable Power Association commissioned a joint 
report (Lee et al, 2005) highlighting what it saw as the huge potential for generating energy 
from waste. Lee et al (2005: 6) suggest that ‘as much as 17% of (UK) electricity generation can 
be satisfied through energy from waste in 2020’.  Many environmentalists would question 
whether energy from waste incineration should ever be classified as renewable energy (Friends 
of the Earth, 2006) and others (e.g. Hogg, 2006) have challenged both the methodology of this 
report and argue that whether or not energy from waste could contribute to climate change 
benefits ‘is dependent upon the assumptions used in the analysis and the performance of the 
relevant technologies’ (Hogg, 2006: i). 
 
The combination of PFI and its use for the construction of large incinerators has a twin impact 
on the trend towards consolidation. In the first place, it opens up new areas for the private 
sector and secondly, the capital investment required tends to exclude all but the largest 
companies. In DEFRA’s view (2005b) there are only eight waste management companies that 
can realistically bid for major, long term PFI contracts. And because of the large sums involved 
in the PFI schemes, the companies expect long term contracts to justify their expenditure. This 
in turn provides a guaranteed revenue stream for the companies over 25, 30 or more years. 
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However, these long term PFI contracts in waste management are open to the same sort of 
criticism that those in health have received. The Audit Commission (2001) expressed 
reservations:  
 
‘twenty-five year contracts need critical consideration. For example, technology is 
constantly developing and it would be counter-productive if authorities were held to a 
contract for one method of disposal when a more environment-friendly and cost-
effective method is subsequently developed. A number of PFIs in waste under 
consideration involve the building of an energy from waste plant.’ 
 
This is especially true if part of the contract requires the local authority to guarantee a tonnage 
of waste (or a tonnage of a particular type of waste) to be sent to the incinerator (Bulkeley et al, 
2005). Critics argue that any such contractual arrangement will cut across attempts to move to 
a regime of greater recycling. The Chartered Institution of Wastes Management (CIWM, 2005) 
has drawn attention to a potential loosening of the rules of qualification for Renewable 
Obligation Certificates (ROCs) thereby easing the path to further incineration projects. Many of 
the PFI schemes are already generating opposition from environmental groups and others 
concerned about both cost and the negative impact on recycling (Theobald, 2002). The Audit 
Commission (2001) drew attention to the House of Commons Select Committee’s view that 
incineration should play only a ‘moderate role’ in PFI bids, with PFI being used for long-term 
improvements in recycling and composting. ‘If not, we recommend that the role of PFI funding 
for waste management should be progressively reduced’ (House of Commons Committee on 
Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs, 2001). 
 
New guidance was issued in October 2000 by DETR on PFI for waste projects (Ares and 
Bolton, 2002). This attempted to answer the Select Committee’s criticism that PFI favoured 
incineration. The Government’s response to the Select Committee’s criticism argued:  
 
‘We anticipate […] that PFI funding will help to fund long-term improvements in 
recycling and composting. There is no reason why a PFI bid coming forward should 
necessarily include incineration. The Government has already approved one large 
scheme which includes no energy from waste.’ (Environment, Transport and Regional 
Affairs Committee, 2002). 
 
That may be so, but the experience so far is that PFI has favoured large industrial style 
developments – primarily incinerators, but occasionally big Materials Recycling Facilities 
(MRFs), and virtually all the PFIs in place or in procurement have been awarded to the large 
waste companies. The government’s Strategy Unit report (2002) recommended that ‘DEFRA 
should accelerate the programme of work to improve delivery of PFI waste projects’. In 2006 
the Treasury noted that just nine PFI projects had been signed with a further eleven in 
procurement. The Treasury (explained the slow progress by reference to planning problems, ‘a 
constrained market of bidders for end-to-end services (encompassing collection, treatment and 
disposal) and affordability pressures relating to the costs of disposal’ (HM Treasury, 2006: 32). 
 
The OECD reports that increasing incineration would be a cheaper way of meeting EU targets 
than recycling ‘but would mean building more than 100 additional incineration plants’ (OECD 
2002). The authors noted that public opposition might make this unfeasible and added that a 
reduction in the production of municipal waste would be far more cost-effective than increasing 
either disposal or treatment capacity. However, this is unlikely to be a very attractive policy 
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option for the main waste multinationals. ‘Big is beautiful’ in waste disposal as far as the 
multinationals are concerned, and that primarily means incineration plants funded by PFI..  
5 Consolidation and concentration 
 
The rhetoric of the Conservative party (e.g. Conservative party, 1976) stressed the importance 
of small businesses, the entrepreneurial spirit and how its deregulatory and privatisation 
policies would benefit small firms. Yet waste management is a good example of how the 
opposite occurred in practice during the Thatcher and Major governments. Here was a sector 
dominated by small businesses (with the municipal side served by local authorities 
themselves), which liberalisation and privatisation helped to transform into one increasingly 
dominated by large companies. It may not have been the objective of ministers, but such an 
outcome should surely have come as no surprise. 
 
According to Biffa, one of the major companies, in 1992 none of the five largest companies had 
more than a 6% share of the UK waste market - not just municipal waste (Biffa, 2005). Biffa 
estimate that in 1992 the market was worth £3.0 billion and that the top 5 companies had 16% 
of the market, the next 15 had 14% and over two thirds (70%) was split among the other 
companies. By contrast, it estimated that in 2001, the market had grown to £4.6 billion, the top 
6 companies had almost half (48%) of the market, the next 9 had 12% and the rest just 40% 
(Biffa, 2005b). In 2004 the government reported the market to be worth £8 billion with the 
expectation that it will double again by 2015 (CEED, 2006). Most companies in the wider waste 
management sector are still SMEs with 90% of companies employing fewer than 50 staff (HSE, 
2004), but the top eight waste companies have around 65% of the total turnover of the sector 
(CEED, 2006). 
 
The current government is struggling to resolve its commitment to competitive markets as the 
driver of efficiencies with the fact that the infrastructure demands of policy decisions and 
competitive pressures in waste management have resulted in market concentration and less 
competition. Several government reports have pointed to the lack of competition identifying 
eight or nine firms as accounting for more than 70% of non-DSO waste collection by weight 
(CEED, 2006). Although there are a large number of suppliers country-wide, many of them are 
regionally or locally based without a national presence, and competition in some regions is 
particularly weak. Because of the relatively small number of suppliers (for collection, treatment 
and disposal) the OGC (2006: 15) warned that there is a danger ‘that public sector contracts 
will be competing against one another to attract the attentions of suppliers’. DCLG (2006: 59) 
assesses the municipal waste market – in both collection and disposal - as ‘relatively mature’ 
but one which has ‘over concentrated’. 
Further consolidation, and more to come 
 
Henri Proglio, Chairman and Chief Executive of Veolia Environnement, describes the UK waste 
sector as ‘consolidating and fast-growing’ (letsrecycle.com, 2006). Consolidation has continued 
with the virtual exit of the UK water companies from the waste management sector. 
Furthermore, what Miller-Blackwell (2000) described as the ‘hunter gatherers’ have been busily 
competing with each other for acquisitions. Saur (part of the large French multinational, 
Buoygues) sold Ecovert to a small company; Cory was sold by its UK owner to Montague 
Private Equity, who then sold it on two years later in March 2007, to a group of private investors 
led by ABN AMRO’s Global Infrastructure Fund (Montagu Private Equity, 2007), and Thames 
Water sold its waste management operation to Viridor. At the end of 2005 Shanks bought 
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Cleanaway’s Scottish operation (Letsrecycle.com, 2005a) and sold some of its landfills to 
WRG. Serviceteam was acquired by Cleanaway, but having already sold its German division 
and announced it intended to completely withdraw from waste management (Letsrecycle.com, 
2005), Cleanaway’s owner, Brambles, sold its British operation to Veolia, boosting the latter’s 
total UK annual turnover to €1.6 billion (letsrecycle, 2006). Biffa bought Hales, demerged from 
water company Severn Trent (Biffa, 2007) and sold its Belgian operations to Veolia (Veolia 
Environmental Services, 2006). In turn, Veolia sold its interests in the company which indirectly 
controlled Spanish construction and services company FCC (Veolia Environment, 2004), which 
then bought WRG (apart from its energy from waste operation) from Terra Firma, another 
private equity organisation - again after only a few years ownership, (The Times, 2006). 
 
It is unlikely that the latest bout of acquisitions represents the end of the process of 
consolidation. Economies of scale available to the larger companies in big landfill or 
incineration contracts, together with their easier access to financing ‘appear to be important 
factors in the process of shake-out and consolidation now occurring in the UK waste industry’ 
(Nevin, 2000). As the market has expanded, the number of leading firms has declined and the 
leading firms have a growing share of this growing market. Turnover provides a rough and 
ready measure of the current position of the different firms. 
♦ Table I: UK turnover of large operators 
 
Company 
(Parent) 
Country of parent UK Turnover (£m) No. of UK 
employees 
    
Veolia Environmental 
Services (Veolia 
Environment) 
France £1,100  
(proforma revenues 
following acquisition of 
Cleanaway, y/e 311206) 
13,000 
Biffa UK £742.7 
(y/e 300307) 
5,147 
WRG and Focsa 
(FCC) 
Spain £620 ( y/e 311206) N/K 
Sita 
(Suez) 
France £604.25 (y/e 311206) 5,055 
Viridor 
(Pennon) 
UK £298.9 (y/e 310306) 1,388 
Cory 
 
Consortium of Dutch, 
Spanish and Portuguese 
financial groups 
£180 (y/e 311206) 1,000 
Shanks UK £126 (y/e 310306) 706 
    
Sources:  
Biffa (2007) Annual Report and Accounts 2007. High Wycombe: Biffa; Cory Environment (2007) About Us 
http://www.coryenvironmental.co.uk/about/ ; FCC (2006) Acquisition of Waste Recycling Group: Creating a 
European Leader in Waste Management, 18 July, 2006 
http://www.fcc.es/fcc/corp/informe/20060718_WRG_eng.pdf ; Letsrecycle.com (2006a) WRG projects moving 
ahead despite sale, 18 July, 2006. http://www.letsrecycle.com/info/waste_management/news.jsp?story=5845 
Montagu Private Equity 130307 Montagu Private Equity announces the sale of Cory Environmental. 
http://www.montaguequity.com/news/?id=1734 ; Pennon Group (2006) Annual Report and Accounts 2006. Exeter: 
Pennon Group; Shanks Group plc (2007) Annual Report and Accounts 2007. Milton Keynes: Shanks; Sita (2007) 
SITA UK key figures 2006. http://www.sita.co.uk/news/key-figures ; 
 18
Veolia Environmental Services (2007) Report and Financial Statements 2006. London: Veolia Environmental 
Services. 
 
The outcome of this complicated series of acquisitions and sales is that the UK municipal waste 
market is even more concentrated than before, with four key players – Veolia, Biffa, FCC and 
Sita. 
Integrated waste management 
 
The changes in the market outlined in the previous section have taken place side by side with 
the move towards a more integrated approach from the private sector companies. All of the 
larger waste management companies are highly integrated. This contrasts with most waste 
SMEs that tend to be single service/product companies (CEED, 2006). Developments in the 
UK have been part of a European pattern. The major companies share a view on the future 
direction of the waste management industry. The two large French multi-utility multinationals 
that own two of the leading UK waste companies, Veolia Environnement (parent of Veolia 
Environmental Services) and Suez (parent of Sita) have put similar models before their 
respective investors (Vivendi, 2001; Suez, 2001), emphasising an environmental services 
industry approach. And this is a view shared by many of the other main UK waste companies. 
Companies are aiming to provide a range of waste management services rather than 
concentrate on just collection or disposal. Offering an integrated service provides economies of 
scale and lower costs (Health and Safety Executive, 2004). It also serves to further ensure that 
the smaller companies are pushed to the sidelines by the larger companies. 
Integrated or disaggregated? 
 
There are indications that the government believes further integration with private sector 
provision is a desirable outcome. Within the broader context of public service reform, the new 
Labour government sees the integration of private and third sectors in public service provision 
as an important part of its concept of ‘joined-up government (Clark, 2002). As detailed earlier, 
the previous Conservative government split responsibility for waste collection and disposal (at 
least in many parts of England). This was part of the strategy of bringing in the private sector to 
run disposal. There are now signs that the current government may wish to end the division. 
 
The Number 10 Strategy Unit has recommended that DEFRA consider combining district and 
county councils into single ‘resource management authorities’ over the next three to five years 
in order to increase recycling and waste reduction (Strategy Unit, 2002). But this would be the 
integration of responsibilities under one municipal body, not in-house service provision.  
 
The government has identified the need to move to integrated waste management contracts 
(DEFRA, 2004a) in order to meet its commitments under the Landfill Directive. However, it has 
also highlighted as one of the ‘key challenges that face the sector’ (DCLG, 2006: 59), the 
integration of services within integrated waste strategies, thereby creating barriers to entry for 
niche providers, SMEs and third sector bodies. The Office of Government Commerce (OGC, 
2006) now recommends that large, end-to-end contracts are the exception rather than the norm 
as they not only squeeze out SMEs but ultimately lead to a restricted market. To resolve this 
dilemma, the government now encourages ‘disaggregated contracts’ (DEFRA, 2007a: 81) for 
integrated services. It acknowledges that this is not easy, citing the fact that although incentives 
have been established to encourage joint working, ‘real integration is difficult to achieve in 
practice’ (DCLG, 2006: 71). 
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The Office of Fair Trading (2006) has also warned the government of the dangers of market 
domination by the larger private firms able to supply integrated waste services. The OFT points 
out that in some regions a single company may have a very high market share due to its 
ownership of assets in the region. It warns of the threat of collusion and urges councils to find 
‘mechanisms to deliver bids from a number of suppliers, both within and outside the region’ to 
reduce the danger of regional monopolies. Unfortunately this appears to ignore both the high 
cost of the transportation of waste and its undesirability (contrary to the ‘proximity principle’ of 
treating waste as near as possible to where it is generated). Interestingly, given the virtual 
elimination of LAWDCs and the concerns about the emergence of regional private monopolies, 
DEFRA speculated whether a local monopoly caused by a successful LAWDC bid might not be 
a more ‘benign’ monopoly than if the LAWDC were transferred to a PFI contractor as ‘the 
owner of the LAWDC (the WDA) would be less inclined to exploit it’s monopoly position to 
ensure increased financial returns at the potential expense of the local community (both social 
and business)’ (DEFRA, 2005: 21). 
 
The growth of local authority responsibility without direct control has been a feature of the 
marketisation of municipal waste. Options available to councils increasingly depend on how 
private companies respond to regulatory and legislative requirements imposed at national and 
European level (Bulkeley et al, 2005). Ambitious interventionist policy goals now ‘have to be 
realised through the orchestration of fragmented networks of providers’ (Entwistle, 1999). This 
has proved to be a problem which the government is trying to resolve by encouraging new 
approaches, including examining the role of local government as a strategic commissioner 
(DCLG, 2006a) with a broader responsibility beyond municipal waste. It urges partnerships and 
presses the claimed benefits of joint working on local authorities (DCLG, 2006), so much so 
that some commentators argue that this policy ‘push’ should be considered alongside 
legislative drivers (Slater et al, 2007: 647). However, the same writers caution that ‘policy 
rhetoric promoting partnerships for delivering sustainable resource management and as a local 
governance mechanism is not borne out in practice and should be treated with caution’ (ibid: 
643-644). At times, the government appears to rest a great deal on a rather naïve faith in the 
private sector cavalry riding over the hill, such as when the 2007 Waste Strategy declares that 
‘all parts of society will have to share responsibility’ and ‘the waste management industry will 
have [my emphasis] to invest in facilities to recycle and recover waste, and provide convenient 
waste services to their customers to recycle and recover their waste’ (DEFRA, 2007: 10). Their 
shareholders may have a different view. 
 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
If, as Burnham (1999) observes, political economy concerns the nature of the relationship 
between political authority and market power (or states and markets) then UK municipal waste 
management offers a case study of the practical impact of politics on markets. Liberalisation 
and privatisation led directly to the creation and then restructuring of a market from what was 
previously a service largely provided by the municipal sector. In the last twenty years, the UK 
waste management sector has grown for two main reasons. First, the higher environmental 
standards imposed by the European Union and secondly, the growth of privatisation, which has 
resulted in the increasing absorption of municipal waste management into the wider UK waste 
market. 
 
Over a twenty year period, we can distinguish two phases. The first ten years saw the 
introduction of markets into municipal services as an end in itself (with a series of subsidiary 
aims such as the reduction of taxes and public expenditure). The second period saw the further 
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development of marketisation as a means to meet policy objectives on the environment. The 
government’s experience of some of the problems associated with this has led it to the view 
that it needs ‘a more proactive approach to market shaping and development’ (DCLG, 2006: 
98). In a distorted echo of Polanyi’s double movement (1944), we see an attempt to create a 
self-regulating market in municipal waste management followed by government intervention in 
response to the failures of the market to meet the wider environmental policy goals of society. 
As Entwhistle (2005: 201) observes, ‘principals operating in a hierarchy have access to a 
greater range of instruments of control than do principals operating through markets’. 
♦ Table II: Change in waste management 1988-2007 
 
 1988 2007 
   
Ownership of municipal 
waste operations 
Almost wholly publicly owned 
(municipal) 
Increasingly privately owned 
   
Profile of private sector 
provision 
Large number of SMEs 
(dispersed ownership) 
Dominance of small number 
of large firms (concentration) 
   
Level of multinational 
activity 
Low High 
   
Integration of municipal 
waste management  
(collection, treatment and 
disposal) 
Integrated on municipal basis Increasingly integrated on 
private sector basis 
   
 
Today the industry is increasingly dominated by a relatively small number of large companies. 
They are attempting to continue their growth through a combination of acquisition and the push 
to contract out remaining municipally-owned service provision. From 1988 onwards, the 
municipal waste management sector was aggressively opened up to the private sector. In order 
to facilitate this, an integrated (but poorly funded) waste management service was broken up. 
Large foreign multinationals were attracted to the UK waste market on the basis of 
opportunities offered by CCT. The entry of these companies and the changes in the municipal 
waste sector have had a knock-on effect in the commercial and industrial waste sector as well. 
A period of frantic consolidation through mergers and acquisitions followed and today a small 
group of companies dominate the UK market. 
 
But their involvement has also influenced public policy in municipal waste management. The 
increasingly important private companies are attracted to mechanisms such as PFI (because of 
the reliable long term revenue streams) and large industrial projects such as incineration 
facilities (because of the returns on investment). This inevitably squeezes options for recycling 
as a response to the government’s obligation under the EU directive to reduce the amount of 
waste sent to landfill. The length of many of these contracts means that these effects will be 
long lasting. The restructuring of the sector has highlighted the problems in coordinating major 
policy shifts through markets. 
 
Finally, concentration has assisted the reintegration of the industry on a private sector basis – 
both in terms of the service offered to municipalities (collection, disposal and treatment) and 
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that offered by the very same companies to their large commercial and industrial customers. 
The British market reforms broke up an integrated waste system provided by the public sector 
and, after a brief period of relative competition, laid the basis for the re-integration of the 
industry – in the private sector. Throughout this period of change, political decisions have, 
directly and indirectly, transformed the sector. Rather than disinterested spectators of market 
development, politicians were central to the process, and remain so as they continue to attempt 
to shape the market. 
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